The United States’ attack on Venezuela is condemnable from many angles. For the first time, the country has been bombed on its own territory by a foreign government. But in politics, appearances often deceive. With the little information available—and by observing the facts and the behavior of the actors—the plot of the Venezuelan conflict seems to have taken an unexpected turn: an internal coup within Chavismo, facilitated by “imperialism.”

Events are still unfolding, but as of the time of writing there are four facts that allow for a preliminary hypothesis: the attack itself, Donald Trump’s statements, Delcy Rodríguez’s statements, and the decision of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice.

1) The attack: overwhelming force, nonexistent defense

After months of siege and pressure, and following attacks against boats that left more than 100 victims, the U.S. military struck Venezuela in the early hours of Saturday, January 2. There is no official damage report. According to reports, at least several military targets were bombed in Caracas, La Guaira, Aragua, and Miranda, with a particular focus on Fuerte Tiuna, where Nicolás Maduro was located.

So far, the government has not published figures for the dead and wounded. The New York Times speaks of at least 40 fatalities, among military personnel and civilians. It is speculated that most of the casualties occurred during Maduro’s capture.

What is most striking is not only the attack itself, but the absence of a Venezuelan military response. Although the possibility of an extraction operation had been announced, the reaction was null—if not outright nonexistent: there are no images of defensive fire of any kind, nor signs of sustained resistance. Some analysts joked that “the gringo helicopters strolled around as if they owned the place.” The journalist specialized in military affairs, Sebastiana Barráez, said that at that moment half of the country’s military personnel were on “Christmas leave.” Trump, for his part, claimed there were no equipment losses and no incidents involving U.S. personnel during the operation.

2) Trump: the implicit confession of a new script

The second act was Donald Trump’s press conference, where he confirmed the capture of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores. There he uttered lines that, taken together, sound less like propaganda and more like signals of a deal: he said he had “spoken at length with Delcy Rodríguez,” that “Rodríguez would do whatever they told her,” that she “would govern Venezuela for a time,” and he capped it off by dismissing María Corina Machado with a deliberately humiliating phrase: “a pretty woman, but with no backing inside Venezuela.”

Beyond the tone, the central message was clear: Trump positioned Delcy as an interlocutor and as a transitional piece.

3) Delcy: boilerplate anti-imperialism, crucial omissions

Delcy Rodríguez spoke next. Yes, she used the typical anti-imperialist jargon of Chavismo and said Venezuela “would not be a colony.” But her speech had a different center: demanding proof that Maduro was alive and displaying a folder with the alleged decree of a “state of external commotion”—a set of provisions whose text no one knows—to ask the TSJ for an interpretation.

And above all, her first address was full of omissions and turns that are hard to ignore:

She called off the mobilizations that other Chavista spokespeople had promoted against the attack, and urged “calm” and “staying at home.”

She gave no figures for deaths or injuries, nor did she speak about the scale of the damage.

She moved away from the narrative of an “attack against the population” and, despite a few harsh lines, sounded unusually condescending toward the United States after an aggression of that magnitude.

In a situation like this, what is left unsaid often says more than what is spoken.

4) The TSJ: the shortcut to avoid calling elections

Finally, the decision of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. Months earlier, Nicolás Maduro had spoken about activating a “decree of a state of external commotion” in the event of an attack. Its content, to this day, remains secret. What matters is not the mystery, but the political usefulness. That decree, supposedly, would include a formula to define who exercises presidential functions in the president’s absence.

Delcy requested an “interpretation” from the TSJ, and the tribunal responded with speed: it named her “acting president.”

The problem is that the Constitution does not contemplate the figure of an “acting,” “provisional,” or “interim” presidency in the event of the president’s absence. Article 233 establishes that if there is an absolute absence before four years of the term have elapsed, the Executive Vice President assumes the presidency in order to call new elections within 30 days (and swear in the elected candidate, following the procedure). With the simulation of the “commotion decree,” Delcy avoids the decisive point: she does not declare an absolute absence, and she does not call elections.

Put simply: the TSJ manufactured an exit ramp to hold on to power without following the constitutional route.

The backdrop: a faction prepared to manage continuity

Delcy Rodríguez and her brother Jorge Rodríguez have been central figures in the Chavista top leadership for years. Jorge is credited with cold intelligence, room to maneuver, and a talent for negotiation: he has led the official side in various processes, including the Barbados Agreement. He has also built bridges to businesspeople, “opposition” parties, and sectors of civil society that have been described as “normalizers.”

In recent months, moreover, a positioning operation in the United States would have been promoted— including media interviews—aimed at presenting Delcy Rodríguez as a “reliable” and “moderate” figure. If that is the case, then what happened would not be an accident: it would be the operational phase of a plan.

Conclusion: it’s not the “classic invasion”; it’s something murkier

We will have more data in the coming hours, but so far everything points to a surprising situation: a faction within Chavismo would have handed Maduro over to preserve control of power, with U.S. support or endorsement.

If right now you are genuinely outraged by the U.S. incursion—and rightly so: the precedent is terrible—do not become a useful idiot for the left-wing oligarchies. This does not look like the simplistic postcard version of a traditional “imperialist invasion.” It smells more like an internal reshuffle, a managed substitution, and a cosmetic continuity. A negotiated betrayal.

Don’t take my word for it. Look, compare, connect the dots, ask yourself questions. And above all: think for yourself.